India’s largest Commercial & Industrial renewable energy platform, built on an asset-owning, long-term PPA model.

Clean Max Enviro Energy Solutions Limited, founded in 2010 and headquartered in Mumbai, is India’s largest Commercial & Industrial (C&I) renewable energy provider, with over 15 years of operating history and roughly 4.2 GW of operational renewable capacity across Asia as of mid-2026. The company develops, builds, owns and operates solar, wind and wind-solar hybrid power plants, and sells the electricity generated to corporate clients under long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) — an “OPEX” model in which CleanMax bears the capital cost and the customer simply pays for the power it consumes, typically at a discount to grid tariffs.

The business is split into two segments: a Renewable Energy Power Sales segment (the bulk of revenue, from long-term electricity sales) and a Renewable Energy Services segment (asset-light services and carbon solutions). CleanMax serves over 590 corporate customers across automotive, cement, steel, pharmaceuticals, FMCG, IT and data-centre sectors, including long-standing partnerships with Google, Apple, Meta, Cisco, Equinix, Volvo, Tata Motors and Bengaluru International Airport. Roughly a third of revenue is concentrated in its top 10 clients. Beyond India, CleanMax operates in Thailand, the UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

CleanMax listed on the NSE and BSE via a ₹3,100 crore IPO (fresh issue of ~₹1,200 crore plus an offer-for-sale of ~₹1,900 crore by promoters and early investors including Brookfield, Augment and DSDG) in early 2026, priced in a band of ₹1,000–₹1,053 per share. The founder and Managing Director, Kuldeep Jain, along with promoter entities BGTF One Holdings (DIFC) and Kempinc LLP, continue to hold a controlling stake post-listing. The company’s contracted renewable capacity had reached roughly 6.8 GW as of June 2026 — over 2.5x its operational base — giving clear visibility into future capacity commissioning and revenue growth, most recently reinforced by a term sheet with Envision Energy for 310 wind turbines (1,550 MW) and an expanded 900+ MW renewable partnership with Meta.

Rapid top-line scaling and sharply improving operating margins, but thin and volatile bottom-line profitability so far.

Consolidated revenue has compounded at roughly 25% over 5 years and 27% over 3 years, accelerating to ~28% on a trailing-twelve-month (TTM) basis as newly commissioned capacity ramps up. Operating margin (OPM) has expanded sharply from ~39% in FY21 to ~59–60% in FY25–FY26 as the portfolio has scaled, though net profit has been volatile — CleanMax swung to losses in FY23 and FY24 (largely due to high depreciation and interest costs on a rapidly growing asset base) before returning to profit in FY25 and FY26. The very high 121% TTM profit growth reflects this low, volatile base rather than a stable earnings trend.

*Pre-IPO EPS figures reflect a much smaller pre-listing share count and are not comparable to the post-IPO EPS of FY26/TTM.

Balance-sheet growth mirrors the capex cycle: total assets have grown nearly 9x since FY21 to ₹22,555 crore in FY26, funded largely by debt (borrowings up ~9.5x to ₹12,684 crore). Free cash flow has been persistently negative as the company continues to fund new capacity build-out well ahead of operating cash generation — a normal feature of a growth-stage independent power producer, but one that keeps leverage and interest costs elevated for now.

A 10-year FCFF model built around the contracted-capacity growth runway, discounted at a 12% WACC with a 5% terminal growth rate.

Given CleanMax’s rapid but capex-heavy growth phase, we model unlevered free cash flow to the firm (FCFF) over 10 years: revenue growth tapering from ~30% to ~8% as the 6.8 GW contracted pipeline is progressively commissioned and growth normalises; EBITDA margin improving gradually from ~56% to ~62% on scale economies; and capex intensity easing from ~45% of revenue to ~15% of revenue as the portfolio matures from a build-out phase into a steady-state operating phase.

Rich on P/E, broadly in line on EV/EBITDA — CleanMax’s valuation looks different depending on which yardstick is used.

Against listed renewable energy peers, CleanMax’s P/E of ~100x is elevated in absolute terms, though it sits within a sector where triple-digit multiples are common for young, high-growth developers still building out capacity (Adani Green ~127–139x, NTPC Green ~126–155x). On EV/EBITDA — arguably a more relevant lens for a capital-intensive, high-depreciation, growth-stage IPP — CleanMax’s ~17.4x is roughly in line with the peer average (ACME Solar ~15.4x, Adani Green ~23.8x, ReNew Energy ~9.9x), and applying the peer-average EV/EBITDA of ~21.6x to CleanMax’s TTM EBITDA implies a per-share value close to the current market price.

P/E and EV/EBITDA vary meaningfully by data source and date given CleanMax’s small and volatile earnings base and its short listing history; figures above are representative ranges compiled across multiple market-data sources between mid-2026 dates, not a single point-in-time snapshot.

On pure book value, CleanMax trades at a significant premium — unsurprising for an asset owner priced on future cash flows, not historical cost.

CleanMax’s reported book value is ₹396 per share (FY26), against a CMP of ₹1,348 — a price-to-book of roughly 3.4x. Since the underlying assets (solar, wind and hybrid plants) are carried on the books largely at depreciated historical cost rather than at the replacement or discounted-cash-flow value of their long-term PPA revenue streams, a pure NAV/book-value lens understates the economic value of a portfolio with long-dated, contracted cash flows — but it is a useful floor-value reference and a reminder of how much of the current price is a bet on execution and growth rather than backed by net tangible assets today.

On a no-growth, sustaining-capex basis, CleanMax’s current earnings alone do not comfortably cover its debt load — the entire thesis rests on growth converting into cash flow.

EPV strips out growth and asks: what is the business worth if it simply sustains today’s earnings power indefinitely? Using TTM EBIT of ~₹876 crore (TTM operating profit less depreciation), a 25% tax rate gives NOPAT of ~₹657 crore. Capitalised at the 12% WACC, this implies an enterprise EPV of only ~₹5,475 crore — well below the current net debt of ~₹12,500 crore, which would leave a negative notional equity value on a strict no-growth basis.

This is a genuinely important data point, not just a modelling curiosity: it confirms that CleanMax is not yet a business whose current, static earnings power justifies its valuation or debt load — the investment case depends entirely on the 6.8 GW contracted pipeline being commissioned and converting into the higher, steady-state cash flows modelled in the DCF. Investors should treat EPV here as a “sanity floor” flag rather than a valuation anchor.

Two distinct businesses under one roof — a capital-intensive power-sales utility and an asset-light services arm — argue for a blended, segment-aware valuation.

CleanMax’s Renewable Energy Power Sales segment (the bulk of revenue and nearly all of the balance sheet) behaves like a regulated-utility-style, contracted-cashflow business best valued on EV/EBITDA in the 10–14x range typical of long-term PPA power assets. Its smaller Renewable Energy Services segment is asset-light, carries higher incremental margins, and would command a richer 15–18x EBITDA multiple more typical of an energy-services or advisory business. CleanMax does not disclose a full segment-wise EBITDA split in the summary financials used for this report, so a precise SOTP build is not possible here; directionally, however, blending the two segment multiples in proportion to their likely revenue mix produces a SOTP value broadly consistent with the ₹1,250–1,350 range implied by the peer EV/EBITDA method in Section 4, rather than a materially different number.

Zones framed against the blended DCF/relative fair-value estimate of roughly ₹1,300–1,550 and the ₹1,000–1,053 IPO price band.

Zones where the price increasingly outruns even the more optimistic valuation methods used in this report.

A 6.8 GW contracted pipeline against 4.2 GW operational capacity gives CleanMax a visible, multi-year growth runway.

• Contracted-to-operational gap: Contracted capacity of ~6.8 GW versus ~4.2 GW operational implies over 60% embedded growth in the power-sales asset base as under-construction and contracted-but-not-yet-built capacity comes online.
• AI and data-centre demand: Recent wins and expanded partnerships with Meta (900+ MW), Google, Apple and Equinix point to accelerating C&I demand from data-centre and technology customers, a structurally growing segment of India’s power market.
• Turbine supply scale-up: The August 2026 term sheet with Envision Energy for 310 wind turbine generators (1,550 MW) signals an aggressive multi-year wind capacity build-out plan.
• International diversification: Operations in Thailand, the UAE, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia provide an additional, less-penetrated growth avenue outside the core Indian market.
• Margin scale economies: OPM has already expanded from ~39% to ~59–60% as the portfolio has scaled; further operating leverage as more capacity ramps could support continued margin resilience even as competition increases.

Promoter holding has stayed steady near 49.4%; the sharp swing between FII and public categories between March and June 2026 likely reflects post-IPO lock-in and classification effects as much as active selling.

A granular, entity-wise breakup of institutional/fund-house holders (individual AMC names such as those typically sourced from ownership-breakdown pages) was not available for CleanMax at the time of writing — only aggregate figures were found (mutual funds ~2.26% held across 8 schemes; FIIs collectively across 36 foreign portfolio investors). We have therefore presented verified promoter and top-shareholder entity data above rather than fabricate AMC-level names; readers wanting scheme-wise or FPI-wise granularity should refer to the shareholding pattern filings on the BSE/NSE websites, which are updated quarterly and may have moved since the quarters shown here.

The near-25 percentage-point jump in the “Public” category between March and June 2026, mirrored by an almost equal fall in FII holding, is unusual enough to flag: it plausibly reflects anchor investors or early institutional backers (Brookfield, Augment, DSDG) who partially exited via block deals soon after the IPO lock-in, with shares subsequently reclassified as they changed hands, rather than a single coordinated institutional flight. Either way, it is a pattern worth tracking in subsequent quarters for signs of continuing institutional churn.

Published by Zumedha Equity Research · 07 September 2026